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1. INTRODUCTION
In April 2006, Massachusetts established historic precedent by
enacting comprehensive health care reform that promises near-universal
coverage for the state's residents, including 550,000 previously
uninsured. The Massachusetts Plan is a unique combination of employer
incentives, individual mandates, government subsidies, managed
competition, tax incentives, and expansion of existing state welfare and
federally funded programs. The provisions embrace both left-leaning
ideals of health care as a right as well as right-leaning preferences for
health as an individual responsibility. Existing features of
Massachusetts's health care system, including a highly regulated
insurance market, small population, relatively low uninsured rate, and
generous uncompensated care fund, may have facilitated passage and
implementation of the ambitious reform package. Those preconditions
present challenges for other states considering both the practicality and
desirability of similar reform.
The individual and employer mandates, in particular, are ambitious
and controversial. Employers with more than ten employees are required
to offer health insurance to employees or pay an annual per-employee
penalty.l Individuals who do not have or do not enroll in employer
health plans must purchase individual coverage or face state income tax
penalties.2 The difficulty for individuals and small employers,
historically, has been finding affordable health insurance without the
bargaining-power and risk-pooling advantages that large employers bring
to the table. To correct that market condition, the Massachusetts Plan
establishes the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector (Connector),
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I. See infra Part II.A (discussing the employer "payor play" requirement).
2. See infra Part II.S (discussing the individual mandate).
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designed to connect individuals, young adults, and small employers to
affordable quality health insurance.3
This Article briefly describes the key features of the Massachusetts
Health Care Reform Act, focusing particularly on the Connector. It then
offers preliminary thoughts on the expected effect of that mechanism for
creating quality, affordable health insurance products for individuals.
Commentators anticipate that commercial insurers will offer scant
coverage and high-premium, high-deductible plans through the
Connector, which coverage ultimately may be neither more affordable
than current products nor more useful than no coverage at all.4 If the
Connector fails to facilitate the individual insurance mandate,
Massachusetts's promise of universal coverage may begin to unravel.
Moreover, the Plan's usefulness as a model for other states proposing or
considering similar risk-pooling mechanisms will be greatly diminished.
II. ELEMENTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS PLAN
After giving a brief overview of the various pieces of the patchwork
Massachusetts Plan in Part II and Massachusetts's history of health care
reform in Part III, Part IV takes a closer look at one feature of the Plan-
the Connector-a quasi-governmental risk-pooling mechanism. The
Article describes the expected characteristics of Connector individual
health insurance plans and the vulnerabilities that those plans present for
individuals and the Plan itself. The first components of the Plan took
effect on January 1,2007.5 Massachusetts and other states are anxiously
awaiting the results. Meanwhile, other states, most recently California in
January 2007, introduced their own versions, with some noteworthy
variations.6 Massachusetts's experience offers important lessons for
states attempting similar programs and begs the question whether there
are reasons that the Massachusetts Plan, even if successful there, could
be even more difficult to replicate elsewhere.
3. See infra Part lI.D (describing the Connector).
4. See, e.g., John Holahan & Linda Blumberg, Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A Look at
the Issues, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w432, w439 (noting that plans available through
the Connector may "be dominated by plans with high deductibles, other types of high cost-sharing
requirements, or benefit limitations").
5. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, ch. 58, § 142,
2006 Mass. Acts (forthcoming), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sI060058.
htm [hereinafter Mass. Plan].
6. See infra Part 1ll.C (comparing California's plan with the Massachusetts Plan).
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Governor Mitt Romney signed the Massachusetts Health Care
Reform Plan? on April 12, 2006.8 The Plan promises, but does not
guarantee or directly provide, universal coverage to Massachusetts
residents.9 The public-private patchwork Plan is distinctly different from
universal coverage, which distinction was essential to its passage. IO
Single-payor, or "socialized" medicine, like the doomed Clinton plan,
would likely have been a political non-starter. ll Massachusetts's politics
featured, on one side of the aisle, a Republican governor, who has since
entered the 2008 presidential race, representing the view of health care as
individual responsibility.12 On the other side of the aisle, Massachusetts
7. Mass. Plan, supra note 5.
8. MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY & POPEO, P.c., HEALTH ALERT: MASSACHUSETTS
ENACTS LANDMARK HEALTH CARE REFORM BILL: AN OVERVIEW OF H. 4850, "AN ACT PROVIDING
ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE, QUALITY, ACCOUNTABLE HEALTH CARE" (2006), http://www.mintz.
comlnewsletter/2006IHealth-Alert-Landmark-Refonn-BiIl-4-13-061index.htm [hereinafter HEALTH
ALERT).
9. See generally KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., KEy FACTS: MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM PLAN (2006), available at
http://www.kff.orgluninsuredluploadl7494.pdf (providing an overview of the Plan); Massachusetts
Health Care Reform, L. WATCH (Foley & Lardner LLP, multiple locations), May 31, 2006 (same);
Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w432, (discussing the passage of the Plan and its potential for
success); HEALTH ALERT, supra note 8 (same).
10. See Elizabeth Mehren, Expansive Health Plan Won't Fit All States, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2006, at A5 (quoting head of Galen Institute, Washington health policy research group, observing
that Massachusetts managed to "slice up the problem" of health insurance coverage).
II. See Could Massachusetts Take the Lead on the Path to Health Care Reform?, STATE
HEALTH WATCH, Aug. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 12418755 [hereinafter STATE HEALTH
WATCH] (suggesting that single-payer plan would be more efficient, with lower administrative
costs); see also Rashi Fein, Universal Health Insurance-Let the Debate Resume, 290 JAMA 818,
818 (2003) (revisiting the universal health care issue a decade after the failed Clinton plan); The
Physicians Working Group for Single-Payer Nat'l Health Ins., Proposal ofthe Physicians' Working
Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798, 799 (2003) (suggesting private
sector resolutions would be a disaster under current extravagant health care utilization); Anna
Bernasek. Health Care Problem? Check the American Psyche, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,2006, § 3, at 3
(arguing for single-payer system).
12. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w443 ("Achieving universal coverage anywhere
will clearly require an individual mandate even if an employer mandate is also part of a state's
refonn."); John E. McDonough et aI., The Third Wave ofMassachusetts Health Care Access Reform,
2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w420, w424 (noting that establishment of '''individual
responsibility'" for health insurance is "[a] controversial and unprecedented aspect of Chapter 58");
Nancy C. Turnbull, The Massachusetts Model: An Artful Balance, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB
EXCLUSIVES w453, w454 (noting Massachusetts's history of viewing lack of health insurance as
shared problem and that new Plan "is a fundamental cultural shift" that makes health insurance
purchase "an individual responsibility"); Gloria Gonzalez, Massachusetts Reform Praised Amid
Concerns, Bus. INS., June 19, 2006, at 4 (noting that insurers praise emphasis on individual
responsibility because residents who can afford to purchase insurance should and quoting Charles
Baker, President and Chief Executive Officer of Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Inc., who described
the plan as "terrific"); Mehren, supra note 10 (noting that the plan emphasizes individual
responsibility); Mitt Romney, Health Care for Everyone? We 've Found a Way, WALL ST. J., Apr.
II, 2006, at A 16 ("Some of my libertarian friends balk at what looks like an individual mandate.
But remember, someone has to pay for the health care that must, by law, be provided: Either the
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had an overwhelmingly Democratic state legislature and strong patient
and consumer advocacy groups, advocating the view that health care is a
right. 13 A successful comprehensive approach to health reform would
have to bridge that wide divide. 14
The Massachusetts Plan relies on a patchwork of existing and
expanded private and public health insurance systems. The Plan requires
employers to either provide health insurance for their employees or pay a
fixed penalty or surcharge into the state uninsured care pool of funds. It
also requires individuals to purchase health insurance, much like
mandatory automobile liability insurance, either through employer plans
or individually. State subsidies are available for residents falling below
designated income levels. In addition, the state will coordinate an
insurance purchasing pool-the Connector-to address market
inequalities that typically make such policies prohibitively expensive for
individuals and small employers.
A. Employer "Payor Play" Requirement
Beginning January 1, 2007, Massachusetts employers with 11 or
more employees are required to "play," that is, to establish and maintain
health insurance "cafeteria plans," consistent with state requirements and
U.S. Internal Revenue Code § 125, meaning that employees' and
employers' contributions to the plan are paid with pre-tax dollars. IS
individual pays or the taxpayers pay. A free ride on government is not libertarian.").
13. See STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note II (quoting New America Foundation health
policy program director, describing Republican governor "shaking hands with a legislature that I
think we would agree is among the bluest of blue" legislatures in the country); Jane Zhang, States
Take a New Look at Health Reform, WALL ST. J., May 27-28, 2006, at A4 ('''If Ted Kennedy and
the overwhelmingly Democrat legislature in Massachusetts can come to an agreement with a
Republican governor around the idea of private health insurance plans, then Vennont should be able
to do it, too.''' (quoting Vennont governor's spokesperson»; see also Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reforming
the Health Care System: The Universal Dilemma, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 21,22 (1993) (describing the
"spectrum of views" from health care as "essentially a private consumption good, whose financing is
the responsibility of its individual recipient" or "a social good that should be collectively financed
and available to all citizens who need health care, regardless of the individual recipient's ability to
pay for that care"); The Physicians' Working Group for Single-Payer Nat'l Health Ins., supra note
II, at 799 ("Access to comprehensive health care is a human right. It is the responsibility of society,
through its govemment, to ensure this right.").
14. See STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note II (quoting Commonwealth Fund president Karen
Davis, noting "[o]ne particularly cogent lesson" of Massachusetts plan implementation was that it
"successfully brought together numerous players from across the political, business, health care
delivery, and policy sectors").
15. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 47(a) (defining "contributing employer" as "an employer that
offers a group health plan, as defined in 26 U.S.c. 5000(b)(I), to which the employer makes a fair
and reasonable contribution"); id. § 47(b) (defining "pay" requirement for employers with eleven or
more employees).
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Employers can self-insure or purchase health plans through the
Connector. In either case, employers are required to make a "fair and
reasonable contribution" to the cost of employees' health coverage.
Employers that do not contribute to an employee health plan must
instead "pay" into the state uninsured care pool of funds an amount up to
$295 per employee per year. 16 The employer's "fair share contribution"
is intended to cover a portion of the cost that the state pays for free care
used by employees whose employers do not provide health insurance.
Employers can offer an entirely employee-paid health plan but still must
make the fair share contribution to the state. Although some estimates
predict that this employer penalty will generate approximately $48
million for the free-care fund,17 it seems ripe for abuse if the Plan's intent
was to penalize employers for noncompliance with the "play" mandate.
Compared to the cost of a comprehensive health plan for an employee,
employers may rationally conclude that $295 represents a bargain rather
than a penalty. It may be that the low fee was a necessary political
compromise to get employers on-board with the Plan. The amount also
might have been seen as necessary to avoid Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") preemption issues because a higher
penalty might force employers' hands, running awry of the Travelers
"indirect effects" standard. 18
In addition to the fair share contribution, employers whose uninsured
employees access free care must pay a "free rider surcharge.,,19 If any
uninsured employee accesses free care more than three times per year, or
the employer has five or more instances of employees receiving free care
in a year, non-providing employers will be required to pay 10 to 100% of
the state's free care costs. The surcharge is triggered only if employers'
[6. ld. § 47(c)(lO) (providing that "total annual fair share employer contribution shall not
exceed $295 per emp[oyee"). When Governor Romney signed the health insurance reform bill, he
vetoed the employer penalty, but the overwhelmingly Democratic legislature overrode the veto.
Robert Steinbrook, Health Care Reform in Massachllsells-A Work in Progress, 354 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2095, 2096 (2006).
[7. Jeffery Krasner, Bllsinesses Await Rilles for Avoiding Healthcare Levy, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 29, 2006, at AI.
[8. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of [974, 29 U.S.C. § I [44(a) (2000); see N.Y.
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 662 (1995)
(holding that state insurance laws that have a "connection with" an ERISA plan are preempted, but
not state laws that have only indirect economic effects). Bllt see Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v.
Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183, at *1 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that ERISA preempts Maryland "Fair
Share Act," requiring employers with 10,000 or more Maryland employees to spend at least 8% of
payroll on employees' health costs, or pay the amount that spending falls below that level into state
fund); Illegal Health Care, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2007, at AI8 (suggesting that the Retaillndustry
Leaders decision suggests that the Massachusetts "payor play" mandate is probably preempted).
[9. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 44(a).
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uninsured workers annually incur $50,000 in free care costs. 20 In other
words, there is a $50,000 employer exemption for the free rider
surcharge.
B. Individual Mandate
Another key component of the Massachusetts Plan is the requirement
that all residents over age eighteen maintain a minimum level of health
insurance, effective July I, 2007.21 Just as many states require vehicle
drivers to carry a minimum level of liability insurance, Massachusetts
now requires all residents to have health insurance.22 State standards will
specify "creditable coverage," based on an annual premium schedule,
published annually on December I, with age and rate variations.23
There are religion, hardship, and, most importantly, "no affordable
coverage" exemptions from the individual mandate. 24 "Affordability" is
not defined in the Act but will be set annually by the Connector.25 The
success or failure of the comprehensive state Plan may tum in large part
on the affordability scale. As enacted, the affordability standard and
Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program subsidy scale are not
linked.26 If the affordability standard is set too high, it will likely
overburden the subsidy program. But if it is set too low, the insurance
plans offered at that price may be oflittle value to insureds.27
Individuals who fail to comply with the individual mandate face tax
penalties. In the first year of the Plan, 2007, the penalty is loss of the
personal tax deduction,zs In 2008 and thereafter, the penalty is an
amount up to 50% of the cost of an affordable premium. The penalty
will be collected first by forfeiture of the individual's tax refund and,
20. [d. § 44(b).
21. [d. § 12 (to be codified at MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M § 2(a».
22. See STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note II (quoting Mike Tanner of the Cato Institute,
characterizing individual mandate as "an enormous infringement on individual liberty").
23. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 12 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § I)
(defining "creditable coverage"); id. § 101 (to be codified at MAss. GEN. LAWS ch.176P, § 3(P»
(discussing premium schedule).
24. [d. § 12 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, §§ 3-4).
25. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w436-37 (discussing possible methods for
determining what constitutes "affordability"); Steinbrook, supra note 16, at 2095 (discussing
affordability scale and assumptions relating to individual mandate); Gonzalez, supra note 12
(discussing issues to be worked out by regulations, including affordability scale).
26. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w437; see also infra Part III.C (discussing
Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program, or "CCHIP").
27. See infra Part IV.B.4 (describing Connector vulnerabilities and "name only" coverage).
28. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 12 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2(b».
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then, direct assessment for the balance.29 As with the employer "pay"
penalty, the penalty for failing to comply with the individual insurance
mandate is relatively low. Paying a tax penalty in the amount of half the
annual cost of affordable individual coverage-the cheapest available
plan-may seem like a reasonable alternative to individuals who chose to
"go bare" and not to carry any insurance.
C. Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program
For individuals who cannot afford to purchase health insurance, the
Massachusetts Plan includes state subsidies through the Commonwealth
Care Health Insurance Program (CCHIP).3o Subsidies are available for
low-income individuals not otherwise eligible for Medicaid or the State
Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).31 Only Commonwealth
residents, not undocumented immigrants or others residing temporarily
or illegally in the state, may receive state subsidies to comply with the
individual mandate.32 The subsidized state plans cover inpatient,
outpatient, preventative care, prescription drugs, mental health and
substance abuse treatment, and dental care.33
Residents with incomes below 100% of the federal poverty level
(FPL),34 receive insurance through the Connector with no premiums or
deductibles, and only modest copayments.35 Copayments on prescription
drugs and emergency room visits will be set at Medicaid-level.
Residents with income between 100 and 300% of FPL36 also qualify for
premium subsidies based on a sliding fee scale, which has not yet been
established.37 There is no deductible for any Connector-subsidized plan,
but all state mandatory coverage rules apply.38
29. /d.
30. /d. § 45 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118H, § 2) (establishing CCHIP "[f]or the
purpose of reducing uninsurance in the commonwealth").
31. /d. § 45 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. I 18H, § 3(a)(3)).
32. /d. § 45 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. I 18H, § 3(a)(2)) (restricting eligibility to
an individual who "has been a resident of the commonwealth for the previous 6 months").
33. /d. § 45 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. I 18H, § 6(a)).
34. One hundred percent of FPL for an individual is approximately $9800 annual income.
KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 9, at I.
35. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 45 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. I 18H, § 6(b)).
36. Three hundred percent of the FPL for a family of three is approximately $49,800 annual
income. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 9, at I.
37. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w436.
38. See Tom Miller, Massachusetts: More Mirage than Miracle, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB
EXCLUSIVES w450, w45 I ("Plans purchased by state-subsidized consumers cannot include any
deductibles, but every current state-mandated benefit must be included.").
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The Connector is a particularly intriguing private-market, quasi-
governmental element of the Massachusetts Plan. To facilitate
compliance with the new health insurance mandates, individuals and
employers with fifty or fewer employees can purchase insurance through
the Connector.39
For individuals above 300% of FPL, there are no government
subsidies for plans purchased through the Connector, but those
individuals can pool their purchasing power with others, including small
employers, to bargain for more favorable rates than insurers would
otherwise offer.40 In addition, Connector plans are portable, meaning
that individuals maintain coverage without interruption as they change
jobs or experience gaps in employment.41 Lastly, workers with multiple
employers, such as temporary or part-time employees, can combine the
employers' contributions to their premiums.
The Connector negotiates and contracts with health care providers,
bringing bargaining strength and risk-pooling advantages to the table.
The Connector also bargains for CCHIP plans.42 In addition, the
Connector offers specially designed products for young adults, aged
nineteen to twenty-six.43 Young adults, including students and persons
beginning careers, represent a significant portion of the uninsured.44
The Connector is managed by the Commonwealth Health Insurance
Connector Authority (Authority) and has an eleven-member board of
public and private members.45 The Authority also manages CCHIP
39. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 101 (to be codified at MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § I
(defining "eligible small groups" as employing "at least one but not more than 50 employees" and
"eligible individuals" as an individual "not offered subsidized health insurance by an employer with
more than 50 employees"); § 4 (regarding individual participation); § 6 (regarding small group
participation)).
40. See LEN M. NICHOLS, NEW AM. FOUND., HEALTH REFORM MASSACHUSETTS STYLE: INK
BLOT TEST AND EXAMPLE FOR Us ALL I (2006), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/
Doc_File_3030_l.pdf (discussing how the new purchasing pool will combine the small group and
non-group insurance markets under one set of regulations).
41. McDonough et aI., supra note 12, at w424 (describing features of the Connector).
42. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w438 (stating that participation will initially be
limited to four specified managed care organizations providing coverage to government-funded
programs).
43. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 90; see also HEALTH ALERT, supra note 8 (stating that "19-26
year-olds will be eligible for new, lower-cost, specially designed products offered through the
Connector").
44. Holohan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w436.
45. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 101 (to be codified at MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § 2(a)
(establishing Authority); § 2(b) (specifying size and composition of board)).
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subsidized plans. Its other responsibilities include issuing "good
housekeeping" seals of approval for health plans offering high quality,
low cost products,46 certifying that "affordable" coverage is available for
individuals, and certifying health plans as "creditable coverage.',47
Plans sold through the Connector must offer all state-mandated
benefits, of which there are many-mental health, maternity, and
chiropractic, to name a few.48 Governor Romney's proposed version of
the Plan would have exempted Connector plans from the mandatory
coverage requirements.49 Instead, lawmakers enacted a one-year
moratorium on new mandatory coverage requirements through 2008.50
Otherwise, there is no standardized benefit package for Connector
plans.51 To be affordable, the expectation is that most plans available
through the Connector will offer low premiums but high deductibles,
high cost-sharing requirements, and limited provider networks. 52
E. Section 1115 Medicaid Waiver
Another key feature of the Massachusetts Plan is continuation of the
state's existing expanded Medicaid program. Medicaid is a joint federal-
state health care program for the needy. States that comply with certain
broad federal guidelines are eligible for federal matching dollars.53 The
federal Medicaid statute requires participating state Medicaid program
eligibility up to 200% of FPL,54 States may, however, expand their
coverage beyond the federal limit and receive matching dollars for the
additional enrollees under individually negotiated waivers, so-called §
1115 waivers.55 Section 1115 waivers allow states to experiment with
their Medicaid programs, but the waiver program must be budget-neutral
46. [d. § 101 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § 3(a)(3)).
47. [d. § 101 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176Q, § 3(s)).
48. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w434--35.
49. [d. at w433.
50. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 127.
51. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w438.
52. [d.; see infra Part IV.A (describing characteristics of Connector plans).
53. Federal matching assistance percentages (FMAP) range from fifty to seventy-five.
Massachusetts typically receives a 50% FMAP. See Federal Financial Participation in State
Assistance Expenditures; Federal Matching Shares for Medicaid, the State Children's Health
Insurance Program, and Aid to Needy Aged, Blind, or Disabled Persons for October I, 2006
Through September 30, 2007, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,856, 71,857 (Nov. 30, 2005) (providing
Massachusetts percentage for 2007).
54. 42 U.s.C. § I396d(s)(2) (2000).
55. See Steinbrook, supra note 16, at 2097 (describing § 1115 waivers); see also STATE
HEALTH WATCH, supra note II (discussing states as laboratories); Zhang, supra note 13 (noting that
federal government's expected actions have encouraged state experimentation with health coverage).
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for federal contribution.56 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
specially appointed House and Senate appointees must approve the
proposal. 57
Massachusetts had in place a § 1115 waiver expanding Medicaid
eligibility to 300% of FPL.58 That waiver, which represented $385
million dollars in federal revenue for state health coverage, was set to
expire in 2007. The potential loss of substantial federal health care
funding was a significant driver in bringing lawmakers from opposite
ends of the political spectrum together to enact the Plan.59 The success
or failure of universal coverage in Massachusetts seemed to rest on
renewing the waiver.60
In addition to continuing expanded eligibility, the waiver renewal
submitted to federal authorities for approval included direct subsidies to
safety-net hospitals, shifted insurance subsidies for uninsured residents,
and improved outreach efforts to increase enrollment of eligible
residents. Other Medicaid changes in the Plan include increasing
Medicaid reimbursement rates for hospitals and physicians from the
current level of 80 to 95% of costS.61 Increased reimbursement was
likely considered necessary to ensure that providers continue to
participate in the Medicaid program. For most providers, Medicaid
participation is voluntary; they do not have to accept Medicaid patients
56. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2000) (describing demonstration projects); Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, Research & Demonstration Projects - Section IllS, http://www.
cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGU03_Research&DemonstrationProjects-Section IIIS.asp
(last visited May 31, 2007) ("Demonstrations must be 'budget neutral' over the life of the project,
meaning they cannot be expected to cost the Federal government more than it would cost without the
waiver.").
57. See Charles Milligan, Acad. for Health Servs. Research & Health Policy, Section 1115
Waivers and Budget Neutrality: Using Medicaid Funds to Expand Coverage 3 (2001) ,available at
http://www.statecoverage.netlpdf/issuebriefSOl.pdf (describing approval process); see also
McDonough et al., supra note 12, at w429-30 (describing Massachusetts's negotiations with CMS
over § 1115 waiver).
58. See STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note II (discussing Medicaid expansion).
59. See McDonough et aI., supra note 12, at w429 (noting significance of waiver's expiration
to Massachusetts health reform process); Mehern, supra note 10 (citing Representative DiMasi's
statement that "lawmakers wanted to take advantage of a brief federal funding window that
guaranteed $385 million in annual subsidies"); see also Pamela A. Paul-Shaheen, The States and
Health Care Reform: The Road Traveled and Lessons Learnedfrom Seven That Took the Lead, 23 J.
HEALTH POL. POL 'y & L. 319, 326-27 (1998) (describing the health care funding "crisis" as a
"catalyst" for successful reform efforts).
60. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w433 (suggesting that success of a
comprehensive plan would be hard to imagine without the waiver); Steinbrook, supra note 16, at
2096-97 (noting that implementation depends on many assumptions, including Medicaid waiver
approval).
61. McDonough et aI., supra note 5, at w426.
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and may decline to do so if reimbursement is too low. The cost of
increased Medicaid reimbursement is estimated at $540 million,62 $90
million of which would be drawn from the Commonwealth Care Trust
Fund.63 After two years, hospitals must meet certain quality benchmarks
to continue receiving the rate increases.64
F. Dependent Child "Piggybacking"
Another provision of the plan aimed at closing a potential gap in the
private insurance market. Family health insurance plans must maintain
coverage for young adults on parents' policies for two additional years
after loss of dependent status, or until age 25, whichever occurs first.65
G. Tax Incentives
As noted above, employee and employer contributions to employer-
sponsored group health plans are tax-exempt, under Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) § 125 and state tax laws.66 That tax benefit is expected to
reduce individual insurance costs for Massachusetts residents by 25%.67
The Bush Administration, however, is considering changes to the tax
benefit for employer plans to shift the incentive to health savings
accounts and individual health plan purchases on the open market.68 The
savings generated by reducing the existing tax benefit "would be used to
pay for tax credits for lower-income people who buy their own health
insurance [through state pools, like the Connector,] or for state insurance
pools, or both.,,69 Under the Massachusetts Plan, Connector health
insurance premiums receive pre-tax treatment under state law.70
62. [d. at w422.
63. See id. at w426 (stating that payments to hospitals and physicians from MassHealth will
increase by $90 million).
64. [d.
65. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 49; see McDonough et al., supra note 12, at w426 (regarding
insurance market changes).
66. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w434 (describing federal tax treatment for
employee health insurance premiums); supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing
employer pay-or-play responsibility).
67. See STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note I I.
68. Lynn M. Etheredge, Massachusetts Reform Plus President Bush's Tax Credits: A National
Model, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w444, w444-45; Robert D. Reischauer, Benefits with
Risks-Bush's Tax-Based Health Care Proposals, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1393, 1393 (2007).
69. John D. McKinnon & Deborah Solomon, Bush Plots Health-Care Push, WALL ST. J., Jan.
16, 2007, at A6; see Etheredge, supra note 68, at w445 (noting that proposed federal tax credit could
funnel additional $I50 million into Massachusetts budget).
70. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w435 (noting tax benefit for Connector plans);
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In addition, Massachusetts gives state tax exemption to individual
contributions, expenditures, and earnings under Health Savings Accounts
(HSAs), consistent with existing federal tax treatment of HSAs. The
Bush proposal would add an individual deduction for health care
premium payments, whether employer-based or individual policies, up to
a specified amount. The goals of the proposal are to encourage currently
uninsured individuals to purchase insurance, make individual insurance
more affordable, and reduce the present skewed incentives toward
employer-based coverage.71
H. Uncompensated Care Fund
The Massachusetts Plan eliminates the state's eXistIng
uncompensated care pool and replaces it with the Health Safety Net
Fund.72 For the first year, fiscal year 2007, the Fund will receive the
same state funding level as it did in fiscal year 2006. After 2007, the
only identified funding will come from payor and hospital assessments,
perhaps with the optimistic view that universal coverage will be achieved
and uncompensated care will no longer be as necessary.73 In any event,
there is no assurance of continued state support, in light of new
mechanisms to ensure near-universal insurance coverage.
Ill. THE MASSACHUSETIS MODEL
To predict whether the Massachusetts Plan will succeed and whether
its features can be exported to other states, it is useful to review previous
Massachusetts health reform efforts. In addition, states looking to the
Massachusetts model for guidance should scrutinize unique
characteristics of that state and the context in which the health reform
debate occurred, and which factors may make the Massachusetts Plan
workable there but could pose difficulties for exporting the model to
other jurisdictions.
STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note II (suggesting that tax benefits could .reduce Connector
premium costs by 25%).
71. See Etheredge, supra note 68, at w444 (describing anticipated Bush proposal in conjunction
with Massachusetts Plan).
72. See STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note II (noting October 1,2007, implementation date
for change).
73. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w442 (estimating $175 million increase in state
revenues from employer assessment, free-rider surcharge, and general revenues).
2007] GAP-FILLING, RISK-POOLING, AND THE "CONNECTOR" 1295
A. Previous Efforts in Massachusetts
The 2006 Plan is Massachusetts's fourth wave of state health care
refonn. First, in 1985, the state established the existing uncompensated
care pools, funded in part through provider surcharges.74 The
uncompensated care fund was a piece of a larger refonn package focused
on rate controls. The hospital ratemaking is now deregulated in
Massachusetts, leaving hospital pricing to the free market, but the
uncompensated care pools remain, funded with a combination of federal,
state, hospital, and insurer contributions.
In 1988, Governor Dukakis enacted a universal care law that was
never fully implemented. Most provisions were repealed when Dukakis
lost to the state's first Republican governor, William Weld.75 The law
sought to achieve near-universal coverage by 1992.76 The key provision
was an employer play-or-pay mandate on employers with six or more
employees.77 The "pay" penalty for nonparticipating employers was
$1680 per year per uninsured worker.78 Governor Weld repealed the
employer mandate, with little resistance, given nationwide economic
downturn, tepid legislative support for the plan, and implementation
delays.79 Instead, the state enacted a tobacco tax to fund health refonn.80
Some pieces of the 1988 refonn package were left in place, however,
including the CommonHealth program, which extended Medicaid to
disabled adults returning to work and certain disabled children.81 Also,
the Medical Security Plan, a business levy of $16.80 per worker to fund
unemployment compensation, was retained.82 The Healthy Start
Program, which provides health insurance coverage to low-income
74. See David MacKenzie & Barbara Diamond, Health Care Reform: Reflections on the
Massachusells Experience, BOSTON BJ., May/June 1994, at 7, 8 (noting that 1985 legislation
created uncompensated care pool for the uninsured and imposed a surcharge on "hospital bills paid
by Blue Cross, commercial insurers, HMO's, and private individuals, in an amount sufficient to
offset the free care and bad debt costs of all hospitals").
75. See id. at 7 (reflecting on Massachusetts's 1988 health care law, Chapter 23); Miller, supra
note 38, at w450 (describing 1988 attempt at universal state health care); Steinbrook, supra note 16,
at 2096 (describing controversial 1988 universal health care law).
76. McDonough et aI., supra note 12, at w421.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
8!. Id.
82. Id.
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women and new mothers, remains. 83 In addition, college and university
students were and continue to be required to purchase health insurance.84
In 1997, Massachusetts negotiated its first § 1115 Medicaid waiver,
which had the effect of expanding MassHealth coverage from 670,000
residents in 1995 to 1,038,000 today.85 After the Medicaid expansion
was implemented, the number of uninsured in the state dropped from
680,000 in 1995 to 365,000 in 2000.86 Coverage for children under the
State Children's Medical Security Plan was also expanded.8?
The current Plan, enacted in 2006, went through several versions.
Initially, Governor Romney vetoed the employer "fair share
contribution" penalty, but the legislature overrode the veto. There were
also proposals to exempt employers that provided any minimal, rather
than "fair and reasonable," contribution, which were rejected.88 Others
proposed a minimum employer contribution, e.g., 50% of the cost of
employees' health plans, but that too was rejected.89
Romney also proposed exempting high deductible, limited coverage
plans from the state mandatory coverage requirements. 9o Some
commentators suggested that an effective approach to reduce the cost of
health insurance would be to allow variation in plan coverage because
consumers would pay only for the coverage that they expect to use.91 But
Massachusetts rejected the proposal to exempt Connector plans from
existing mandatory coverage laws, instead promoting high-
premium/high-deductible plans as the affordable alternative to
comprehensive coverage. The Plan does include a moratorium on new
mandatory coverage provisions for the first year of implementation.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Krasner, supra note 17 (discussing the difference between a bill that authorizes "fair
and reasonable" contributions and one that would have authorized minimal contributions).
89. See id. (discussing a higher standard for employer contributions of "at least 50 percent of
the premium").
90. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w439.
91. See. e.g., David R. Henderson, Terminatorcare, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2007, at AI7
(suggesting that abolishing expensive mandatory coverage for chiropractic care, alcoholism and drug
abuse, mental health, and infertility "would allow people who don't want to be covered for these
things to buy cheaper insurance, while still allowing those who want them to buy and pay for
them").
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B. Unique Characteristics ofMassachusetts
Various features of Massachusetts's politics, population, and
business climate facilitated passage of the landmark legislation. Whether
that particular constellation of factors is a necessary precondition for
other states considering similar reforms is very much an open question.92
First, the state has a relatively small, homogenous population-
approximately 6.4 million.93 Also, the state level of uninsured residents
is relatively low, compared to nationwide averages. Before the Plan's
enactment, approximately 550,000, or 10% of Massachusetts residents
were uninsured, compared to 16% nationwide.94 In addition, 59.5% of
Massachusetts residents had employer health coverage.95 Observers
anticipate that 35,000 people in Massachusetts will remain uninsured
after the Plan's enactment.96
Another arguably necessary political expedient to the Plan's passage
was the threatened expiration of substantial federal funding.
Massachusetts's 1997 Medicaid § 1115 waiver, which expanded state
Medicaid coverage to children and the working poor, was about to
expire, representing a potential loss of $385 million federal revenue.97
That threat may have been the impetus for lawmakers with drastically
differing views on health care reform to come together and preserve the
funding. 98
92. See Elizabeth A. McGlynn & Jeffery Wassennan, Massachusetts Health Reform: Beauty Is
in the Eye of the Beholder, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w447, w447 (urging that "the
starting point matters" for other states considering similar reform and noting unique characteristics
of Massachusetts); Mehren, supra note 10 (noting small state, 10% uninsured, low unemployment,
and large base of employers offering health coverage); Miller, supra note 38, at w450 ("An
equivalent hannonic convergence of the above [unique characteristics] remains far less likely in
other states considering similar coverage expansion initiatives.").
93. McDonough et aI., supra note 12, at w421.
94. Id. at w430 (citing 11% Massachusetts and 16% nationwide uninsured figures); Steinbrook,
supra note 16, at 2095 (same); see also STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note II (7% compared to
15%). The expected impact of the Massachusetts plan is to bring 515,000 currently uninsured
Massachusetts residents under coverage, reducing the current number of uninsured in Massachusetts,
estimated at 550,000 (or 715,000, according to some estimates) to close to 35,000. William C.
Symonds, In Massachusetts. Health Care for All?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Apr. 4, 2006, http://
www.businessweek.comlprintlinvestor!contentlapr2006!pi20060404_152510.htm; see also KAISER
COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 9, at I (showing pie-chart).
95. Steinbrook, supra note 16, at 2097; see also KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, supra note 9, at I (citing 68% figure).
96. KAISER COMM 'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 9, at I.
97. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w432-33 (discussing Medicaid waiver
background and impetus for reform).
98. See id. at 443 (describing the competing proposals of the governor, house, and senate);
Zhang, supra note 13 (noting factors facilitating bipartisan solution).
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Massachusetts also already boasted an ample uncompensated care
fund, in place since 1985.99 The fund, supported by both state funding
and provider surcharges, contained several million dollars to support
hospitals serving the poor. Under the 2006 Plan, most of those funds
could be redirected to subsidizing insurance for low-income residents. 100
Perhaps most importantly for the Plan's eventual success,
Massachusetts has a highly regulated insurance market. 101 In addition to
extensive mandatory coverage provisions for health insurance plans sold
in the state,102 Massachusetts has guaranteed issue, meaning that insurers
are prohibited from refusing to sell plans based on pre-existing
conditions of the insured. 103 Also, the state mandates modified
community rating, meaning that insurers must offer plans with prices
based on overall community risk, rather than on individual risks or
experience with the insured-so-called "experience rating.,,104 Those
laws facilitate the "affordability" of plans and residents' ability to
comply with the individual mandate because they effectively mandate
broad risk-pooling, and prohibit by insurers from cherry-picking risks
and insureds from purchasing customized coverage based on individual
preferences.
The overall effect of Massachusetts's existing insurance laws is
redistribution of health care costs. In an unregulated insurance market,
sicker people who are more likely to use health care would end up
paying more for their health insurance than healthier people who do not
require extensive medical treatment. But Massachusetts's health insurers
are prohibited from excluding people who are already sick, pricing their
99. See Turnbull, supra note 12, at w455 (noting the state's long history of "a strong and
relatively well-funded safety net").
100. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w436 (describing safety-net providers and
funds); MacKenzie & Diamond, supra note 74, at 8 (discussing history of uncompensated care
pool).
101. See Chris Sinacola, Is It Reform or Socialist Nightmare? Health Care Bill May Tax Limits
of Freedom, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Mass.), Apr. 13, 2006, at BI (noting
Massachusetts's highly regulated market, including guaranteed-issue and community-rating laws).
102. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory coverage).
103. McDonough et a!., supra note 12, at w426, w430.
104. Minor rate variations may be allowed for certain high-risks, e.g., smokers, or for customers
meeting certain healthy lifestyle standards. Mass. Plan, supra note 5, § 82(a)(5}-(6) (allowing rate
adjustments for wellness programs and tobacco use). See generally Ann Hilton Fisher, Small
Employers and the Health Insurance Needs ofEmployees with High Health Care Costs: A Needfor
Better Models, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 53, 77-78 (2004) (listing states, including
Massachusetts, requiring community rating); Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact ofSmall Group
Health Insurance Reform Laws, 32 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 685, 710 (1999) (describing insurers'
reaction to community rating rules); Olympia J. Snowe, Small Business Health Plans: A Critical
Step in Solving the Small Business Health Care Crisis, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 231, 238 (2006)
(discussing modified community rating).
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policies based on expected risk, or selling customers only the type of
coverage that they expect to use. Healthy people pay more than they
otherwise would, effectively subsidizing sicker people who pay less than
they otherwise would.
C. California Comparison
As soon as the Massachusetts Plan went into effect in January 2007,
other states, notably California, proposed similar patchwork approaches
to universal coverage, expanding government programs, imposing new
requirements on private industry and individuals, and adding insurance
regulations to try to close the uninsured gap.
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's proposal is similar to
the Massachusetts Plan in many respects, with some significant
differences. 105 Like Massachusetts, California failed in past attempts to
implement health care reform. A 2004 ballot referendum that would
have required employers to provide health insurance to their employees
failed. 106 The current proposal includes an employer pay-or-play
provision for employers with ten or more employees. Estimates from the
Governor's office suggest that 80% of California employers are small
firms and, accordingly, would be exempt. 107 The California "pay"
sanction, payable into the state uninsured pool, is assessed at 4% of the
employer total payroll 108 instead of the flat $295 per employee, as in
Massachusetts.
Like Massachusetts, California would require individuals to obtain
health insurance, either through an employer, individually, or through the
state Connector-type risk pooling mechanism. The individual mandate
would be enforceable through not only tax penalties but also wage
garnishment. 109
In addition to requiring employers and individuals to fill the gap, the
California plan imposes new requirements directly on health care
lOS. See All Things Considered: The Massachusetts Health Plan, and California's, (NPR radio
broadcast Jan. 10,2007), available at 2007 WLNR 547932 (describing Governor Schwarzenegger's
proposal that "every Californian get health insurance" as risky because "California has more
uninsured people than Massachusetts has people").
106. Rachel Gordon, San Francisco City Debates Mandate for Health Benefits, S.F. CHRON.,
Apr. 21, 2005, at B I.
107. See Associated Press, Arnold's Plan to Stir Debate, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007
(describing California plan); Sara Watson Arthurs, Health Plan Brings Praise, Concerns, TIMES-
STANDARD (Eureka, Cal.), Jan. 10,2007 (same).
108. Arthurs, supra note 107.
109. Sonya Geis & Christopher Lee, Schwarzenegger Proposes Universal Health Coverage,
WASH. POST, Jan. 9,2007, at A3.
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providers and insurers. Providers must pay a tax, or surcharge, in the
amount of 2% of revenues for physicians and 4% for hospitals. I 10
Massachusetts already exacts a surcharge on providers and insurers to
fund the uncompensated care fund. III
New California requirements on insurers include guaranteed issue,
meaning that insurers cannot discriminate based on age or diagnosis in
issuing policies. The proposal also requires insurers to spend at least
85% of premiums on patient care, limits spending on administrative
overhead, and caps profits. 112 Otherwise, insurers seem pleased with the
proposal, anticipating four million to five million new customers. In
addition, the plan does not include any caps on premiums or mandatory
coverage provisions.
Like Massachusetts, California would expand existing state welfare
programs and add subsidies to assist low-income people purchase
individual coverage. The state Medicaid program, Medi-Cal, would be
expanded to adults up to 100% of FPL and children, regardless of
immigration status, in households up to 300% of FPL. 113 California
anticipates an additional five billion in federal matching dollars with
Medicaid expansion. Subsidies would be available for persons up to
250% of FPL. Massachusetts, by contrast, does not cover undocumented
residents in its expanded Medicaid and extends subsidies up to 300% of
FPL. The California proposal would also increase provider re-
imbursement under Medi-Cal by $4 billion. It is not clear, however, how
the provider surcharge and Medi-Cal reimbursement increase would net
out.
Whether the Massachusetts and California plans succeed in
achieving near-universal coverage for their residents may tum on unique
characteristics of each state. There are numerous differences between
California and Massachusetts, but a few are worthy of mention. First,
California has a much larger, more diverse population, with a greater
percentage of undocumented residents than Massachusetts. 114 The
110. Bill Ainsworth, Governor Wants All Insured, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Jan. 9, 2007, at AI
(describing the term "coverage dividend"); Vanessa Fuhnnans, California Gets Healthy Response,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 19,2007, at AIO (describing surcharges).
III. See MASS. OEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 1180, §§ 18, 18A (West Supp. 2007) (describing
uncompensated care trust fund and hospital surcharges); 114.6 MASS. CODE REGS. § 11.06
(surcharge payments); see also MacKenzie & Diamond, supra note 74, at 8 (describing provider and
insurer surcharges).
112. See Allen P. Roberts, Jr., Gov. Proposes 'Payor Play' Health Reform, L.A. Bus. J., Jan. 8,
2007.
113. Jennifer Steinhauer, California Plan for Health Care Would Cover All, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2007, at AI.
114. See Mehren, supra note 10 (quoting health policy analyst Laura Tobler of National
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proposal to cover all children, regardless of immigration status, could
make the California plan significantly more expensive. California also
has a higher level of uninsured, 19% or 6.5 million people, than
Massachusetts, at II% and the nationwide average of 16%.115 The state
has more low-income residents, with approximately 45% below 300% of
FPL, compared to 28% in Massachusetts. 116 Those differences present a
greater challenge mandating individual coverage. Another key
difference is California's relatively unregulated insurance market,
including lack of comprehensive mandatory coverage provisions,
guaranteed issue or community rating requirements. Without those laws
in place, California's insurance market may fragment into high-risk
insureds paying high premiums, rather than the risk spreading effect that
exists in the Massachusetts market. States considering similar plans will
need to carefully consider whether the unique constellation of factors in
Massachusetts is a necessary precondition for successful reform. 117
IV. CONNECTOR PLANS
Other Symposium participants have given comprehensive
consideration to various features of the Massachusetts Plan. This Article
provides a focused critique of one component of the plan-the quasi-
governmental risk-pooling conduit, or Connector. First, I describe
expected characteristics of health insurance policies offered through the
Connector. Then, I identify expected vulnerabilities of those policies for
the overall success of Massachusetts's universal coverage objective.
Finally, I predict various regulatory and market responses to the
Connector's failure.
Conference of State Legislatures on differences between California and Massachusetts).
115. STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note I I (citing statistics of 20.7% uninsured in California,
compared to 13.1 % in Massachusetts); Jim Carlton, Schwarzenegger Embarks on Fight for Health
Plan, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2007, at A2 (comparing California rate of uninsured, at 19.4%, to
nationwide average of 15.9%).
116. STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note II (comparing California and Massachusetts low or
modest income levels).
117. See, e.g., Bolder Could Make Health Care Reform Better, PORTLAND PRESS-HERALD, Apr.
15, 2006, at A7 (comparing the Massachusetts Plan and Maine's Dirigo Health initiative); M.
William Salganik, Universal Health Care: Can It Work Here? Shared Responsibility is Key to Bay
State's Compromise, BALT. SUN, Apr. 20, 2006, at ID (discussing the Massachusetts Plan and health
care reform in Maryland); Zhang, supra note 13.
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A. Characteristics o/Connector Plans
Plans sold through the Connector can be expected to share certain
characteristics. The goal is to make health insurance affordable for
individual and small group purchasers to facilitate compliance with the
individual and employer mandates. Accordingly, Connector plans will
likely have low premiums, in the neighborhood of forty to sixty dollars
per month for individual coverage. I 18 Individuals who previously have
"gone bare," with no health insurance, due to unaffordability or low risk-
aversion, will likely be drawn to plans with low upfront costs. The most
expedient way for insurers to offer low premium plans is to require high
cost-sharing by policyholders. Deductibles could be expected to be
approximately $1000 to $5000 for individuals, or $2500 to $10,000 for
families. 119
In addition, consumers should expect steep copayments on
Connector plans. Copayments are the classic health insurance approach
to patient moral hazard, that is, the tendency to seek more health care
when insured than when paying out of pocket. Third-party insurance
health plans shield patients from the "true costs" of the medical care that
they receive. Copayments are designed to make patients think carefully
before seeking medical care and appreciate the costS.1 20
In addition, Connector plans will likely offer insureds limited
networks that exclude high-cost providers. Plans will also limit coverage
to the extent aliowable under Massachusetts's mandatory coverage and
other insurance regulations. Although Connector plans must comply
with existing state mandatory coverage requirements, there is no
standardized benefit package, making it difficult for consumers to
118. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w435, w438 ("The intent is that the Connector
would hold down premiums by having plans with relatively high cost-sharing requirements and
limited provider networks.").
119. See id. at w435, w439 (characterizing high deductible plans); Michele Melden, Guarding
Against the High Risk ofHigh Deductible Health Plans: A Proposal for Regulatory Protections, 18
Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 403, 405 (2006) (characterizing High Deductible Health Plans (HDHPs) as
plans with deductibles above $1000).
120. See Melden, supra note 119, at 413 (noting the term moral hazard refers to "the fact that an
individual is likely to incur greater costs when someone else is financially responsible"); Malcolm
Gladwell, The Moral-Hazard Myth, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2005, at 44, 46, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/printablesifact/050829faJact ("[W]hen your insurance company
requires that you make a twenty-dollar co-payment ... or when your plan includes an annual five-
hundred-dollar or thousand-dollar deductible, it's not simply an attempt to get you to pick up a larger
share of your health costs. lt is an attempt to make your use of the health-care system more
efficienl.").
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compare costs and coverage. 12l Moreover, insurers may include
"hidden" or surprise exclusions or limits, such as a strict, annual four-
visit limit on primary care physician appointments or specialist referrals,
or exclusions of common benefits, such as prescription drugs.
Connector plans may also be combined with HSAs to gamer federal
and state tax benefits. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
included certain changes to the Internal Revenue Code to provide tax
benefits to HSAs combined with High Deductible Health Plans (HDHPs)
meeting certain requirements. 122 Individual contributions to HSAs
receive pre-tax treatment. In addition, HSA expenditures and earnings
are tax- exempt. The Massachusetts Plan extends state tax benefits to
HSA contributions as well. Although these plans offer another way for
Massachusetts residents to leverage their health care expenditures under
the new individual mandate, consumers so far have not made much use
of HSA-HDHPs. Among employees offered HSAs through employer
plans, one-tenth of employees contribute nothing to the accounts. 123
B. Connector Vulnerabilities
In this Article I do not attempt to evaluate the entire Massachusetts
Plan but instead focus on the individual and small group market and the
Connector. I identify various vulnerabilities with the Connector plans
and predict that the device is unlikely to successfully achieve or
approach universal coverage. Those market failures will likely require
increased government regulation and subsidization to achieve the aim of
meaningful insurance coverage for currently uninsured Massachusetts
residents.
121. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w438-39 (discussing problems associated with
Connector plans).
122. 26 V.S.C.A. § 223 (West Supp. 2006). See generally Edward J. Larson & Marc Dettmann,
The Impact ofHSAs on Health Care Reform: Preliminary Results After One Year, 40 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 1087, 1097-1100 (2005) (describing HSAs).
123. See PAUL FRONSTIN & SARA R. COLLINS, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EARLY
EXPERIENCE WITH HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE AND CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH PLANS: FINDINGS FROM
THE EBRI/COMMONWEATH FUND CONSUMERISM IN HEALTH CARE SURVEY 5 (2005), available at
http://www.cmwf.orglusr_doc/fronstin_consumerism_survey.pdf (finding that 9% of the privately
insured population ages 21 to 64 were enrolled in an HDHP eligible for an HAS but had not yet
opened an account).
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The first problem that I anticipate is a low take-up rate for individual
or small group coverage, despite the mandates. HDHPs expected to be
sold through the Connector traditionally have not been very popular,
especially in Massachusetts, where good comprehensive coverage is
available. As noted above, HDHPs are characterized by high cost-
sharing, limited networks, and limited coverage, which are tum-offs to
people who actually value insurance. For people who previously
declined or could not afford insurance, the individual mandate may
increase the demand for those types of plans. 124 If someone is
accustomed to no insurance and no monthly premium, a low premium
with the possibility of steep out of pocket costs-should he decide to use
the coverage-is probably not that different from the status quo ante.
In addition, some individuals may decide that paying the tax penalty
is preferable to buying coverage. After the first year, the penalty
amounts to 50% of "affordable" coverage, or the cheapest available plan.
Just as employers may rationally determine that paying $295 per
employee is a better deal than providing coverage, individuals may
decide that paying half the cost of a HDHP for no coverage is a better
deal than paying the full amount for paltry coverage.
One proposal, which was never pursued, was to sanction individual
noncompliance by denying drivers licenses to individuals who do not
purchase health insurance, as done with automobile liability insurance.
Even that sanction, however, might not substantially increase
compliance. The likelihood of individuals rationally choosing not to
comply with the individual health insurance mandate seems great,
especially when one considers the 15% nationwide average rate of
noncompliance with mandatory automobile liability insurance. By
comparison, the nationwide average of people lacking health insurance is
124. Twenty percent of uninsured workers declined employer plans, per KFF 2006 because of
premium cost. See Melden, supra note 119, at 421 & n.85 (citing Kaiser Commission); see also
Larson & Dettman, supra note 122, at 1110-15 (discussing low lake-up rales for HSAs).
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17%.125 Therefore, it is not clear how much would be gained by
requiring individuals to purchase health insurance.
2. Correlation with Employer Mandate
Another problem with the Connector is that its success seems to
inversely correlate with the employer mandate. The better the employer
mandate works in terms of covering people through employer plans, the
fewer people left purchasing through the Connector. Fewer people mean
a smaller risk pool and weaker bargaining position for individuals and
small employers. 126 Smaller risk pools and weaker bargaining power
mean higher premiums, making comprehensive coverage less affordable
for individuals who seek to purchase it. The Connector does little to alter
the existing breakdown of the insurance market, in which the vast
majority of Americans, close to 175 million people, have employment-
based insurance, compared to individual insurance purchasers at just over
25 million people. 127 The already very small individual insurance market
will only decrease if the employer mandate succeeds, making it harder
for those individuals to negotiate favorable terms with insurers.
Massachusetts's employer "payor play" requirement addresses the
nationwide trend of employers offering less comprehensive health
coverage, or discontinuing employer health plans altogether, especially
for part-time or temporary workers. Since 2000, employer health plan
premiums have increased by 8.3%, compared with an overall rise in
wages of 3.7%.128 From 2000 to 2005, health insurance costs increased
by 73%, while wages rose only 15% over the same period. 129 As of
125. See GREG SCANDLEN, NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, WILL MANDATORY HEALTH
INSURANCE WORK? I (2006), available at http://www.ncpa.orglpub/ba/ba569.pdf(noting that all but
three states mandate automobile insurance but 14.6% of drivers remain uninsured and comparing
nationwide 17.2% rate of lack of health insurance); Miller, supra note 38, at w451 (suggesting that
"[clurrent gaps in compliance with mandatory state auto insurance laws, involving a product that is
more affordable and available than health insurance, suggest a threshold degree of difficulty" with
individual mandate).
126. See Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 4, at w437, w441 (noting inverse correlation and
"attractiveness of Connector plans to small employers relative to plans in the non-Connector
market").
127. See Deborah Solomon & David Wessel, Health-Insurance Gap Surges as Political Issue,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2007, at Al (stating the breakdown of how people in the U.S. got their health
insurance in 2005; 80 million have government insurance and 46 million are unsinsured).
128. Christopher Hogan et al., Tracking Health Care Costs: Inflation Returns, 19 HEALTH AFF.
217, 219-20 (2000), available at http://content.healthaffairs.orglcgilreprint/I9/61217.
129. Melden, supra note 119, at 410; see also LISA CLEMONS-COPE & BOWEN GARRETT, THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., CHANGES IN EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE
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2005, the number of employers offering health insurance had fallen from
69 to 60% since 2000. 130 Rising premiums also impact employee take-up
rates.
The upshot is that even with the employer mandate, the
Massachusetts Plan does not address the underlying problem of rising
health care costs and insurance premiums. Instead, it merely reallocates
the incentives for coverage. If employers respond favorably by
maintaining or expanding employee health plans, the individual
insurance market will shrink, making individuals' ability to purchase
"affordable" individual coverage through the Connector increasingly
difficult.
3. Risk Segmentation: The Insurance "Death Spiral"
Another problem with the Connector is risk segmentation.
Relatively low-risk customers will be drawn to the low-premium
HDHPs, leaving higher risk customers and comprehensive plan
purchasers facing increasingly, perhaps prohibitively, higher premiums.
HDHPs tend to appeal to young, healthy people who do not anticipate
using health care services. As relatively healthy people enroll in
HDHPs, sicker patients continue to adversely select more comprehensive
plans, which increasingly become more expensive because they cover
only the "bad" risks. Higher utilization of comprehensive plan services
means insurers will increase premiums to cover the higher costs, making
those plans less affordable for people who need or choose them. As low-
risk customers move to HDHPs and high-risk customers move to
comprehensive plans, the risk pooling effects of the Connector are
compromised. In addition, lower demand for comprehensive plans
means lower availability and less competition, driving prices up even
higher. Customers requiring comprehensive care fall out of coverage as
they can no longer afford premiums and again become uninsured.
Hence, the "insurance death spiral" results. 131
SPONSORSHIP, ELIGIBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION: 2001 TO 2005 (2007), available al http://www.
kff.orgluninsured/upload/7599.pdf (describing health insurance industry trends from 2001 to 2005);
FRONSTIN & COLLINS, supra note 123, at 6-7, 13 (reporting health care costs under various types of
plans).
130. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., WHO ARE THE UNINSURED? A CONSISTENT PROFILE ACROSS NATIONAL SURVEYS 5
(2006), available al http://www.kff.orgluninsured/upload/7553.pdf; Larson & Dettman, supra note
122, at 1095 (citing same).
131. See Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Salisfy Patients?, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
485, 511 (2004) (noting that consumer-choice health plans can encourage risk-pool fragmentation
and initiate an "insurance death spiral" as "healthier people enroll in consumer-choice plans," while
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Whether the insurance death spiral will result in Massachusetts
depends in large part on where the affordability scale is set. Setting it
low would bring more people into the Connector risk pool because it
would be easier to comply with the individual mandate, resulting in
better loss spreading among individuals. Setting it high would mean
more people qualifying for government subsidies through CCHIP,
shifting the health insurance cost burden back to the government.
4. Name-Only Coverage and Consumer Bankruptcy
Consumers buying HDHPs face a risk of catastrophic health care
costs similar to people who have no insurance at all. Suppose a young,
risk-taking individual, who is just starting his career, has a serious car
wreck, or gets a terrible diagnosis. He may have paid $60 per month
under a low-premium Connector plan to comply with the individual
mandate. But now he must spend $3000 (or $10,000 for a family)
upfront to meet the plan deductible before insurance coverage kicks in-
not to mention substantial copays at every tum of treatment. 132 Even for
routine care, patients must pay the first $3000 of check-ups, prescription
drugs, and laboratory tests before any insurance coverage is available.
Most individuals and families do not have that level of savings. Indeed,
if they were cautious enough to maintain substantial savings, they would
likely have purchased comprehensive plans from the outset. The
financial exposure of enrollees in HDHPs is a serious drawback to
relying on those types of products to achieve universal coverage. The
"coverage" obtained may be no more than nominal. Medical debt is one
of the most important contributors to consumer bankruptcy in the United
States. 133
HDHPs may also have hidden or surprise coverage exclusions, such
as an annual limit on the number of physician appointments or
exclusions for prescription drugs, maternity, and other common services.
sicker individuals enroll in competing plans).
132. See NICHOLS, supra note 40, at 2 (noting that while state law requires maternity coverage,
"it is also technically permissible to satisfy the insurance purchase requirement with a $10,000
family deductible policy").
133. See David Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, 2005
HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w5-63, w5-70, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org!
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.63vl.pdf (stating that "medical problems contribute to about half of all
bankruptcies"); Melden, supra note 119, at 411-12, n.36 (citing sources); see also Melissa B.
Jacoby, Individual Health Insurance Mandates and Financial Distress: A Few Note from the
Debtor-Creditor Research and Debates, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 1247 (2007). Cf Stephen J. Ware,
"Medical-Related Financial Distress" and Health Care Finance: A Reply to Professor Melissa
Jacoby, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 1259 (2007).
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Massachusetts's mandatory coverage laws protect somewhat against
bare-bones policies, but the mandatory coverage requirements also drive
up costs, making it harder for other types of plans to compete. Under
Governor Romney's proposal to exempt Connector plans from existing
and new mandatory coverage, insurers could have offered individually
tailored, a la carte plans. But that approach would radically alter a
fundamental feature of the Massachusetts insurance market. Exempting
Connector plans from mandatory coverage requirements would disrupt
the intended cost-spreading approach that ensures that coverage for
certain essential services such as maternity and mental health remains
affordable. 134
5. Poor Health Outcomes
Another problem with HDHPs is that patients may avoid
preventative or necessary medical care to avoid paying the upfront out-
of-pocket costs. High deductibles and copayments are intended to serve
as a moral hazard "check" on over-utilization and a mechanism for
patients to internalize the cost of care. But there is a substantial risk that
the check will work too well. People may forego preventative care, fail
to follow up with referrals to specialists or diagnostic testing, or decide
not to have prescriptions filled, exacerbating health conditions. 135
In addition, patients may be unable to distinguish between medically
necessary and merely "discretionary" medical care. That concern is not
specific to the Connector but can be alleged generally against consumer-
driven health care (CDHC). CDHC operates on the presumption that
individuals can negotiate, select, and bargain effectively for health
care. 136 There are reams of literature on imperfections in health care
134. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 731 (1985) (describing
background of Massachusetts mandatory mental health coverage law).
The legislature believed that the public interest required that it correct the insurance
market in the Commonwealth by mandating minimum-coverage levels, effectively
forcing the good-risk individuals to become part of the risk pool, and enabling insurers to
price the insurance at an average market rather than a market retracted due to adverse
selection.
[d.
135. See FRONSTIN & COLLINS, supra note 123, at 15-19 (reporting statistics on consumers who
skipped treatment or prescriptions); Mariner, supra note 131, at510 ("[I)fpeople forego needed care
because of cost, their problems may simply be delayed or exacerbated, affecting their lives and
possibly requiring more expensive care in the future."); Melden, supra note 119, at 416 (describing
cost-related access to care problems with high-deductible plan enrollees).
136. See Melden, supra note 119, at 414-17 (discussing the "myth of discretionary health care
spending").
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markets that seriously impair consumers from shopping for medical care
like any other consumer good or service. 13? Perversely, one of the
drivers behind the managed care trend was over-utilization by providers
under cost-reimbursement models of health insurance. Capitation and
other fixed payment strategies and managerial oversight were designed
to check providers' moral hazard to order or provide more care to insured
patients than they otherwise would. If managed care did not trust
medical providers to make sound professional judgments about medical
necessity, it is difficult to accept CDHC's suggestion that patients, as lay
people, will be able to prudently make those same types of
determinations.
This subpart identified potential problems with the Connector's goal
of bringing affordable health insurance to individuals and small groups.
Individuals will likely continue to opt out of health insurance coverage,
despite the mandate. Moreover, the risk-pooling advantages of the
Connector seems to work against the employer incentives to the extent
that the more workers who are insured by employer group plans, the
fewer individuals left purchasing through the Connector. In addition,
adverse selection of low-risk consumers into HDHPs and high-risk
consumers into comprehensive plans would further skew the cost-
spreading effect. 138 HDHPs also carry certain health and consumer credit
risks for individuals who decide to meet the new individual mandate by
purchasing those plans. Given these vulnerabilities, it seems unlikely
that the Connector will operate effectively to facilitate individual health
insurance purchases without government interference. Additional
government regulation and subsidization will likely be demanded if
137. See, e.g., Deborah Haas-Wilson, Arrow and the Information Market Failure in Health
Care: The Changing Content and Sources ofHealth Care Information, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y &
L. 103 I (200 I) reprinted in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS
OF HEALTH CARE 170-71 (Peter J. Hammer et aI., eds. 2003) (describing Arrow's analysis of
problems in medical markets); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 951 (1963) ("Because medical knowledge is so complicated,
the information possessed by the physician as to the consequences and possibilities of treatment is
necessarily very much greater than that of the patient ...."); see also JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE,
PRICING THE PRICELESS: A HEALTH CARE CONUNDRUM 83 (2002) ("Many economists, however,
and virtually all non-economists start from the presumption that consumer or patient information is
poor."); John V. Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism, 47 ST. LOUIS U.
LJ. 397, 399-400 (2003) (discussing problems of the health care market); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The
Pricing of u.s. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57 (2006)
(discussing pricing and payment problems of the health care market); Thomas Rice, Can Markets
Give Us the Health System We Want?, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 383, 415-18 (1997)
(discussing problems of the health care market).
138. See Mariner, supra note 131, at 511 (observing same effect); Melden, supra note 119, at
421 (same).
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Massachusetts's goal of universal coverage IS to be achieved or
approached.
C. Expected Regulatory Responses
The classic response to failure of competitive markets is increased
governmeht regulation and subsidization to help the market to function
as it should. 139 The Connector will likely be no different. 14o Some of the
expected interventions may have a salutary effect while others may
worsen the existing market imperfections.
First, there will be an increased need for CCHIP or other government
subsidies to individual~ as plans become less "affordable." The need for
subsidization is directly tied to the affordability scale, which has not yet
been set. If affordability is set low, more individuals may comply with
the mandate. If it is set high, fewer individuals will be able or willing to
comply without government subsidies. Massachusetts might also
consider special subsidies for "medically needy" individuals who require
comprehensive plans, rather than HDHP plans, which are more
appropriate for relatively healthy individuals. These special subsidies
could prevent or slow the insurance death spiral that could eventually
price medically needy people out of coverage.
Although Massachusetts requires mandatory coverage of certain
types of medical treatment, there is no standardized benefit package
under the Connector. This variation exposes consumers to surprise
exclusions and limits. on services, which may result in name-only
coverage. In addition, lack of standardization makes it difficult for
consumers to shop and compare plans. Therefore, the State might
consider requiring a standard benefits package for plans certified though
the Connector.
To address the adverse health and consumer credit concerns with
HDHPs, lawmakers might consider implementing "first-dollar"
139. See I ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
17 (1970) ("[T)he single most widely accepted rule for the governance of the regulated industries is
regulate them in such a way as to produce the same results as would be produced by effective
competition, if it were feasible."). See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
15-35 (1982) (discussing various traditional rationales for regulation).
140. See Melden, supra note 119, at 423-26 (describing "regulatory vacuum" over HDHPs);
Miller, supra note 38, at w451 (suggesting that the "political temptation ahead will be to change the
role of the Connector from a neutral clearinghouse into a more aggressive regulator and monopsony
purchaser"); Universal Health Insurance in a Private Market? Don't Bet on It, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
2007, at B6 (offering letters responding to David Henderson's Terrninatorcare article, supra note 91,
which rejected the view that health insurance coverage is best achieved through deregulation, rather
than increased regulation).
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exemptions for preventative care, diagnostic testing, and prescription
drugs. 141 Those expenditures would be covered notwithstanding the
plans' otherwise high deductibles. Accordingly, patients would not be
put to the hard choice of whether to pay expensive out-of-pocket costs or
forego early intervention, preventative, or necessary medical care.
Premium limits on comprehensive plans would also help address
affordability concerns. Similarly, to address the risk of medical
bankruptcy posed by HDHPs, lawmakers could restrict the level of
deductibles and copayments. 142
Rate controls, or price caps, are always controversial for competitive
market proponents. 143 Nevertheless, insurance rate controls, as suggested
above, and caps on provider charges or reimbursement might be
necessary to address the root problem in health care: exorbitant costS. 144
In the current market, pricing of medical services is largely left to
providers, responding to market and other incentives to increase rates.
Managed care and other insurance contracts have restricted or fixed
provider reimbursement through certain bargained-for arrangements. In
addition, government health care programs typically offer fixed
reimbursement, based on fee schedules or predetermined payment
amounts. The Massachusetts Plan fails to address rising health care costs
in any respect. In fact, the one provision related to provider
reimbursement works in the opposite direction, increasing Medicaid
reimbursement by $540 million. 145 Ultimately, containing rising health
141. First-dollar exemptions are not required for federal tax benefits of HSA-HDHPs, although
states could provide exemptions for state taxes. See Melden, supra note 119, at 406 nn.12-13 (citing
26 U.S.c. § 223(c)(2)(C) and Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-15).
142. See id. at 429-31 (proposing same).
143. See BREYER, supra note 139, at 36-59 (discussing ratemaking); KAHN, supra note 139, at
159-81 (same); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8-10 (6th ed. 2003) (depicting
and describing inefficiency of price controls); id. at 383-87 (describing problems with regulating
firms' profits).
144. See. e.g., STATE HEALTH WATCH, supra note II (noting that Massachusetts plan does not
address the "cost-effectiveness gap in American health care, marked by spending more than any
other country but not having the best health outcomes"); Steffie Woolhandler et aI., Costs 0/Health
Care Administration in the United States and Canada, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 768, 768 (2003)
(concluding that U.S. health care administrative costs totaled SI059 per capita, compared to 5307
per capita in Canada); Bernasek, supra note II (comparing United States and other countries' health
care spending); David Gratzer, Where Would You Rather Be Sick?, WALL ST. J., June 15,2004, at
A14 (comparing health care spending and health outcomes in United States and Canada); David
Leonhardt, A Lesson/rom Europe on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,2006, at CI (comparing
health care in the United States with that of Europe and Canada).
145. See McDonough et aI., supra note 12, at w426 (noting 590 million increase in Medicaid
reimbursement over three years, or 5540 million total); Turnbull, supra note 12, at w455 (noting
sizeable Medicaid rate increases).
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care costs, rather than expanding health insurance coverage, may be the
key to the success of Massachusetts's and other health reform efforts. 146
V. CONCLUSION
Massachusetts's Health Care Reform Plan was a groundbreaking
effort and the first in a recent trend of state-directed health care reform.
Other states have followed the Massachusetts lead and federal lawmakers
are considering ways to coordinate national reform efforts with state
experiments. Therefore, the key elements of Massachusetts's patchwork
plan to close the existing gaps in health insurance coverage merit careful
consideration. In particular, this Article examines the Connector, a risk-
pooling mechanism through which Massachusetts's regulators hope to
facilitate individuals' compliance with the new state mandatory health
insurance law. Several expected features and vulnerabilities of health
coverage offered through the Connector plans may impair the Plan's
success. Therefore, we can anticipate that Massachusetts's still-to-come
"fifth wave" of health care reform will almost certainly focus on the
issue of cost-containment in medical services. Until that root problem of
health care disparities and lack of access is addressed, other reforms
promise to narrow but not close the gaps.
146. See Turnbull, supra note 12, at w455 ('The long-term success and sustainability of the new
law will depend on finding successful ways to contain health care costs.").
